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.JURISDICTION

When May State Courts Exercise PersonalJurisdictionOver
Nonresident Class Members
by Gene R. Shreve

Phillips Petroleum Co.
V.

Irl Shutts
(Docket No. 84-233)
Argued February25, 1985
The Supreme Court's rulings on federal subject matter jurisdiction and on the scope of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have restricted opportunities to bring small claim, large class consumer actions in federal court. With some success, plaintiffs have
responded by bringing the same cases in state courts.
But a concern which has long been relatively dormant
now threatens to close the doors of state courthouses to
many of these cases. Members of small claim consumer
actions frequently come from many different states.
May a state court exercise personal jurisdiction over
nonresident class claimants without violating fundamental guarantees of fairness imposed by the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution? This is the
question posed in PhillipsPetroleum Company v. Shutts.
ISSUES
In Shults, the Supreme Court may consider as many
as three issues. First, it will have to determine whether it
may properly entertain a challenge to the Kansas court's
personal jurisdiction over nonresident class members in
the face of objections that the party opposing the class is
without standing to make the challenge or that the challenge is premature. If the Supreme Court overcomes
these objections, it must consider the challenge raised
here to personal jurisdiction. Finally, should the Court
conclude that Kansas properly exercised personal jurisdiction, it may have to determine whether the Kansas
Supreme Court's application of its own substantive law
to adjudicate the class claims was a choice of law permitted under the Constitution.
FACTS
For periods from 1974 to 1978, Phillips suspended
royalty payments on gas obtained from a large number
of leases while awaiting rate decisions from the Federal
Gene R. Shreve is a Professorof Law at New York Law School,
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Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission). These "suspense royalties" were paid once
Phillips received FPC approval for rate increases. Shutts
and two others filed suit in Kansas state court individually and on behalf of a class of others from whom funds
had been withheld-challenging the failure of Phillips to
include interest in its eventual payments. The trial court
certified a royalty-owner class and reduced it, by subtracting those who opted out or who could not be notified by first class mail, to approximately 28,100
members. The trial court determined the value of the
average class claim to be under $100. Citizenship of the
class was scattered over many states. The affected gas
leases were located in eleven states. The portions of
Kansas residents in the class and of gas leases located in
Kansas were comparatively insignificant. Phillips was
neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business in Kansas.
After trial, the court determined that the class was
entitled to interest on the suspense royalties during the
period they were withheld by Phillips and set the interest
rate. The Kansas Supreme Court modified the interest
rate set by the trial court, but otherwise affirmed.
In a unanimous opinion, the Kansas Supreme Court
(235 Kan. 195, 679 P.2d 1159 (1984)), rejected Phillips'
argument that recent United States Supreme -Court
cases required minimum contacts sufficient to support
personal jurisdiction between the court and nonresident
members of the class. Instead, stated the court: "The
element necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction over
nonresident class members is procedural due process."
The court went on to determine that the safeguards of
procedural due process, notice to the passive (nonparticipating) members of the class and adequate representation of their interests by the class representatives, had
been observed in Shuts.
The Kansas Supreme Court noted case developments which made it difficult to maintain small claim
consumer actions in federal court. Tile Kansas court
asked: "If the state courts will not hear the matter, who
will grant relief?"
Turning to the choice of law question, the Kansas
Supreme Court ruled that it could apply Kansas law to
determine the merits of the case even though the forum
state's contacts with the parties and tile controversies
were not extensive. The court reasoned that, bicause
contacts were diffused over so many states, efficiency
and uniformity would be served by applying the law of

the forum and that, because it had not found compelling
reasons for applying different law, tile presumption that
the forun should apply its own law had not been overcome.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The most significant question raised in Shuns may be
whether the United States Supreme Court will decide to
apply limitations on courts' personal jurisdiction, heretofore designed to protect nonresident defendants, to
limit tile authority of courts to adjudicate the claims of
passive, nonresident members of a plaintiff class.
Shutts thus brings a further complication to all area
of tile law already in a state of flux. In InternationalShoe
Co. v. State of Washington (326 U.S. 310 (19,15)), the
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause allowed jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who
could not be found and served in the forum state-as
long as doing so was fair under the circumstances of the
case. The Supreme Court has struggled since to make
this rather inchoate standard intelligible. With only one
exception, the Court (lid not strike down an assertion of
judicial jurisdiction in the thirty years following International Shoe. Then, in a series of cases (Shaffer v. Heitner
(433 U.S. 186 (1977)), Kulko v. Superior Court of California
(436 U.S. 84 (1978)), World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson (444 U.S. 286 (1980)) and Ru.sh v. Savehuck (444
U.S. 320 (1980)), the Court increased due process protections available to nonresident defendants.
Now, the Supreme Court seems intent on clarifying
and refining its position on tile permissible limits of
personal jurisdiction. The Court decided three personal
jurisdiction cases last term: Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc. (104 S.Ct. 1473 (1984), Preview 1983-84 term, pp.
57-60); Calder v. Jones (104 S.Ct. 1482 (1984), Preview,
1983-84 term, pp. Il1-13); and Helicopteros Nationales de
Columbia v. Hall (104 S.Ct. 1868 (1984) Preview, 1983-84
term, pp. 57-60). And, in addition to Shuits, the Supreme Court has recently heard argument on still another personal jurisdiction case: Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz (Preview, 1984-85 term, pp. 215-16).
Through all these developments, tile Supreme Court
has remained silent until now concerning the possible
implications of its evolving due process doctrine on
courts' power to adjudicate the claims of nonresident
class members. The view taken by a number of courts
and commentators and by the American Law Institute in
its Restatement (Second) ofJudgnents, section 4tl (1982), is
that the clue process concerns of notice and( adequate
representation reflected in such cases as Hansber ' v. Lee
(311 U.S. 32 (1940)) and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)) pose tile proper
standard for measuring the fairness of an adjudication
of the claims of Passive members of a state court class. If
these concerns are satisfied, then this view attaches no
importance to the fact that contacts between the forum
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state and nonresident members of' the class are so tenuous that existing law would have prevented jurisdiction
over the same persons had they been defendants. Some
courts and commentators, however, have taken the opposing view. They argue that passive, nonresident class
claimants may run the same risk as nonresident defendants of being bound by the proceeding and
therefore should be protected by the ,.ale clue process
restraints on the court's personal jurisdiction. They argue that the passive character of class membership status-typically, class members take no action with
reference to tile suit prior to the classwide adjudication-makes it inappropriate to regard nonresident class
members as having consented to the court's jurisdiction
by presenting their claims for adjudication there.
Finally, Shults may provide an occasion for the Supreme Court to return to a subject which recently left it
divided: choice of' law and the Constitution. In its plurality decision, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague (149 U.S. 302
(1981)), a majority of the Court was unable to agree on a
standard by which the Due Process or Full Faith and
Credit Clauses of the Constitution would restrain excessive favoritism of the fortm's own law in the choice of
law process.
Some of the decisional alternatives presented to the
Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Company v. Shutts are
as follows:
1. The Supreme Court may uphold the challenge to the
Kansas court's personal jurisdiction by declaring its
decisions rendered to protect nonresident defendants
also apply in this case. Using these decisions, it could
conclude that the minimum contacts standard set out
in such cases as Kulko andl World-Wide Volkswagen has
not been met. The Court might take this approach if
it views the procedural due process protections of'
notice and adequate representation as insufficient to
accommodate entirely tile concern that passive, nonresident class members be fairly treated. This approach might also pernmit the Court to give some
weight in its analysis to problems of' uncertainty created for tile party opposing the class in such cases.
2. Or, the Supreme Court might decide that any suggestion of detriment to the interests of nonresident class
members might more appropriately be made by tile
class members thenselves. The Court could reason
that, to tile extent that class members have not consented to jurisdiction by being claimants in the case,
they will later be f'ree to question personaljurisdiction
over them by collaterally attacking the class judgment. This could lead the Court to conclude that tile
defendant lacks standing to raise the jurisdictional
challenge or that the challenge is premature.
3. Even if Phillips overcomes problems of standing or
prematurity, the court may agree with the Kansas
Supreme Court and tile American Law Institute that
recent personal jurisdiction precedents should not be
PREVI EW

extended to protect passive, nonresident members of
a plaintiff class. The Court may see the refusal of
these persons to opt out of the class as an informed
decision to litigate in the class action forum. The
Court may note that such acquiescence is usually
sufficient to resolve due process concerns about the
preclusive effect of a class judgment upon memlbers
of the class and may reason that the refusal to opt out
should similarly be regarded as consent to the court's
jurisdiction.
4. If the Supreme Court concludes that the Kansas
court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over
the claims of passive nonresident class members, it
may find it necessary to decide the challenge to the
Kansas Supreme Court's choice of its own substantive
law. The Supreme Court may conclude that tile
substantive policies intended to be advanced by Kansas law are not implicated by the facts of the Shuts
controversy and, therefore, the Kansas Supreme
Court was unjustified in applying its own law. Or, it
may conclude that policies underlying Kansas law did
suggest an interest to be realized by applying that law
in Shults and the Kansas Supreme Court's choice of its
own law was therefore constitutionally permissible.
Even if the Supreme Court does not conclude that
Kansas is an "interested" forum for choice of law
purposes, it may nonetheless let the choice of Kansas
law stand. The Supreme Court might dd illis if it is
unable to conclude that, to apply its owil law, the
Kansas Supreme Court rejected the conflicting law of
another state which did have a perceptible interest in
having its law applied to the controversy. Or, Shutts
might win the choice of law issue by default. This
could happen if the Court regarded the record in this
case to be insufficiently clear or complete to support
adjudication of this complex constitutional question.
ARGUMENTS
For PhillipsPetroleum Company (Counsel of Record,Joseph W.
Kennedy, Fourth Floor, 200 W. Douglas, Wichita, KS 67202;
telephone (316) 262-2671)
1. The assertion of'jurisdiction over nonresident class
members by the court below exceeds the constitutional limits on state court jurisdiction established by
the controlling decisions of this Court.
2. The application of Kansas law by the court below was
repugnant to the Due Process Clause of tile Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution.

Issue No. 12

For Shutts (Counsel of Record, W. Luke Chapin, 1). 0. Box
148, Medicine Lodge, KS 67104; telephone (316) 886-5611 )
1. Phillips lacks standing to raise dile process claims
belonging exclusively to adverse parties who are fully
capable of raising such claims themselves.
2. Applying basic principles of restitution embodied in
Kansas law to all class membler claims was neither
arbitrary nor unfair and resulted in no relevant cotiflict with the law of any other state.

AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In support of PhillipsPetroleum Company
Amoco Production Company argues that tile decision below violates both the Full Faith and Credit and
Due Process Clauses by applying Kansas law to transactions having no connection whatsoever with the Kansas
forum.
The National Association of Independent Insturers
contends in a separate brief that the decision of tile
Kansas Supreme Court threatets to disrupt reguilation
of the insurance business hy subjecting insurers to nationwide class action litigation in the conrts of one state
on issues properly determined by the laws, insurance
departments and courts of each state iti which the disputed transactions occurred.
The Legal Foundation of America additionally argued that tile decision of the coutt below threatens
concerns of federalism underlying jurisdictional requirements.
In support of Shutts
The Constumer Coalition, an Illinois tmt-for-profit
corporation, filed a brief which argued that applying the
"minimul contacts" test to state court class act ions
would deprive the state courts of the continued ability to
conduct national class actions without which national
groups of consttmers would be unable to obtain redress
in disputes with multistate enterprises.
Public Citizen, a nonprofit, public interest organization, argued that tile correct due process standard for
this case is found in ilathews v. Eldridge (12-1 U.S. 319
(1976)), not in cases such as International Shoe Co. v.
WeLshingon (326 U.S. 3 10 (19,10)), or other cases ill which
defendants were sued in states other than their residence.
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ARGUMENTS: MARCH SESSION
Monday, March 18

Tuesday, March 19

Wednesday, March 20

5. Coin ntdits Futures v. Weintraub (8.261)
6. Ramirez v. Indiana (84-5059)
7. .il)iirota . Uinitel States (84-5108)
8. Williams v. 'erlt
(84-592)

9. United Statles v.Ilagley (84t-,t8)

Monday, March 25

Tuesday, March 26

Wednesday, March 27

I. Alano Foundation v. )onovaln (831935)
2. Supt.. Mass Corr. Inst. v. I fill (84-138)
3. jean v. Nelson (84-52,10)
4. Atascadero State Iiosp. v. Sanltu (8-1351)

5. Sch. Coninittee of Burlington v. )ept.
1)1Ed.. Mlass. (84-.33)
6. Landreth Tihnber Co. %.Landreth (831961)
7. (;ould v. Ruelenaclit (84.-165)
8. Thlmnas Acting Adnin.. EPA v. Unioin
Carl)ile (84-497)

I. Tennessee v. Street (83-2143)
2. Cit, of Cleburne v. Clehurne Living
Center (84-468)
3. Black v. Romano (84-465)
4. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chr)sler-P)lymouth, Soler Chrysler- Plymouth v. Mitsuhishi Motors (83-1733)

10. Oklahonma v. (astleberry (83-2126)
II. McDonald v. Smith (84-176)
12. INS %.Rios-I'hneda

9. Walters.\. Riidiaiiho Surlvivor-,(841-571 )

10.C. Dept. (ifIiitclie v. IHeckler (8321316)
II. Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Ii ighlands (8,1 il)
12. Baldwin s . Alahainta (84-574t3)
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